Co-benefits, contradictions, and multi-level governance of low-carbon experimentation: Leveraging solar energy for sustainable development in China by Lo, K. & Castán Broto, V.
This is a repository copy of Co-benefits, contradictions, and multi-level governance of 
low-carbon experimentation: Leveraging solar energy for sustainable development in 
China.




Lo, K. and Castán Broto, V. (2019) Co-benefits, contradictions, and multi-level governance 
of low-carbon experimentation: Leveraging solar energy for sustainable development in 
China. Global Environmental Change, 59. 101993. ISSN 0959-3780 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.101993





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
Co-benefits, contradictions, and multi-level governance of 1 
low-carbon experimentation: Leveraging solar energy for 2 
sustainable development in China 3 
 4 
Abstract 5 
China’s photovoltaics poverty alleviation (PVPA) initiative is an ambitious and innovative 6 
programme that explores the synergy between renewable energy and sustainable development 7 
by using photovoltaics to generate income for impoverished households and communities. 8 
However, policy experimentation in China is a decentralised process that is shaped by both 9 
central and local actions. This paper examines the experimentation of the PVPA from a 10 
multi-level perspective based on Heilman’s experimentation under hierarchy framework. 11 
Drawing from empirical evidence collected over two years from a PVPA pilot, we show that 12 
China’s multi-level approach to experimentation requires dynamic mechanisms that enable 13 
the adaptation of national-level models to specific locations. The resulting experimental 14 
governance thus extends from a combination of top-down mechanisms of control, bottom-up 15 
responses, and the broader contradictions that emerge from their interactions. 16 
Keywords: low-carbon experimentation; renewable energy; sustainable development; co-17 
benefits; multi-level governance; China 18 
 19 
1. Introduction 20 
The last two decades of climate research have provided two key insights into the governance 21 
of climate change at the subnational level. The first insight is the realisation that targeted 22 
climate change mitigation policies can have co-benefits and has led to an interest in sub-23 
national climate action as providing ‘bundles of opportunities’ (Heinrichs et al., 2013; Koehn, 24 
2008). In particular, there is a growing emphasis on integrating renewable energy with 25 
sustainable development goals in developing countries, such that investment in renewables is 26 
not just environmentally friendly but also produces economic and social benefits for the poor 27 
(Holden et al., 2014; Kumar et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2015). However, despite the evidence of 28 
co-benefits, some commentators have questioned whether low carbon policies can be pro-29 
poor as they depend on infrastructure investments that may exacerbate endemic poverty 30 
(Colenbrander et al., 2017). The second insight is the need for more considerable attention to 31 
the mechanisms of multi-level governance—that is, to complex systems of networked actors 32 
operating at multiple levels, through formal and informal mechanisms—as an effective means 33 
to deliver climate policy (Di Gregorio et al., 2019). However, there is a concern about the 34 
extent to which the diversification of governance means results in a blame avoidance game, 35 
whereby responsibilities are displaced towards increasingly unaccountable levels of 36 
government (Bache et al., 2014). Low carbon policies are shaped by inherent contradictions 37 
which are not always reflected in the narratives of action but become painfully evident during 38 
the process of implementation (Castan Broto, 2015). 39 
These contradictions around both decentralisation and multi-level governance have become 40 
visible in China’s photovoltaics poverty alleviation (PVPA) initiative, whose objective is to 41 
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use renewable energy to deliver sustainable development objectives. While it is common for 1 
governments and international agencies to use renewable energy systems such as 2 
photovoltaics, biogas and small hydro for addressing energy access and environmental 3 
protection issues (Alstone et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2012; Chen and Liu, 2017; Kong et al., 4 
2015; Pang et al., 2015; Sovacool and Drupady, 2012), the PVPA is different as it aims to use 5 
renewable energy to generate direct financial benefits for impoverished rural communities 6 
and households (Geall et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018). As such, the PVPA explores the 7 
potential of a new social co-benefit of low-carbon policies. 8 
The PVPA illustrates a distinctly Chinese style of formulating policy—a process that 9 
involves conducting a large number of local policy experiments through multi-level 10 
governance (Chen et al., 2017; Smart and Smart, 2001; Zeng, 2015). This style has been 11 
described as experiment under hierarchy, and it is shaping environmental policy not only in 12 
China but also in the global arenas where China is increasingly perceived as a leader in 13 
delivering low-carbon policies (Andrews-Speed and Zhang, 2018; Lo, 2016; Shin, 2018; 14 
Urban, 2015). The notion of policy experimentation that we present in this paper follows 15 
Heilmann’s characterisation of policy development in contemporary China as a dynamic 16 
process comprising bottom-up experimentation and top-down control (Heilmann, 2008b). 17 
The consequences of this approach are evident on the ground: local governments are tasked 18 
with formulating substantive policy, and their experience plays a significant role in shaping 19 
national policy. The Chinese government has put forward a success story based upon this 20 
experimentation approach, which links it with wider aspirations to demonstrate leadership in 21 
climate policy worldwide (Hansen et al., 2018). However, while ideas of eco-civilisation 22 
have shifted local policies and planning paradigms in China, environmental management 23 
decisions still rely on a techno-efficiency paradigm where technology implementation is 24 
prioritised over other welfare and ecological protection concerns (Pow, 2018; Westman and 25 
Castán Broto, 2019). The case of the PVPA provides an opportunity to examine the specific 26 
features of the policy experimentation style in China, particularly with reference to the 27 
emerging concerns in global environmental governance about the delivery of wider co-28 
benefits for the poor and how to facilitate multi-level governance. 29 
2. Multi-level governance and experimentation  30 
Experimentation has emerged as a paradigm in research on climate change governance, 31 
particularly linked to ideas of radical change and societal transitions (Turnheim et al., 2018). 32 
At the local level, climate change experiments have been embraced as a means to intervene to 33 
deliver urgent action in the context of uncertainty (Castan Broto and Bulkeley, 2013; Madsen 34 
and Hansen, 2019; Reed et al., 2015). However, in-depth analyses of urban experimentation 35 
have suggested that experiments emerge alongside a process of state reconfiguration that 36 
requires new means of governing and controlling people and environments  (Bulkeley et al., 37 
2014). This critical work points towards how states can adopt experimentation as a strategy to 38 
reach locales which were previously outside of control. China’s experimental style of 39 
governing climate change is a prime example of this.  40 
In his influential paper, Heilmann (2008b) developed an account of China’s experiment-41 
based policy cycle to explain the country’s capability of introducing socioeconomic reforms. 42 
At the heart of the experimentation under hierarchy model is the conduct of centrally 43 
coordinated but locally implemented experimentation being extensively used to guide policy 44 
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formulation and institutional reforms. By conducting multiple experiments in different 1 
localities, novel solutions emerge by trial and error and can be learned and adopted by central 2 
policymakers (Xu, 2011). The model explains how China’s policy cycle is significantly 3 
different from the conventional model commonly adopted in democratic polities, especially 4 
regarding the presence of top-down control and the conduct of local experiments through 5 
implementation: 6 
The conventional model of the policy process that is widely taken for granted by jurists, 7 
economists, and political scientists holds that policy analysis, formulation, and 8 
embodiment in legislation precede implementation. Policy experimentation, as presented 9 
in this study, means innovating through implementation first, and drafting universal laws 10 
and regulations later. (Heilmann, 2008b, p.4) 11 
China’s experiment-based policy cycle can be thought to consist of three stages: small-scale 12 
piloting, large-scale piloting, and nationwide implementation. In the first stage, a small 13 
number of local governments became “experimental points” in charge of developing the 14 
policy from scratch. The central government select pilots based on three principles. The first 15 
principle is voluntarism, which holds that local governments should be willing to become 16 
pilots. Typically, calls-for-applications are issued, and the central government selects pilots 17 
from a pool of applicants. Local governments could be interested in becoming a pilot for 18 
several reasons such as perceived personal, institutional, and local benefits of 19 
experimentation, individual preferences for innovation and the presence of supportive 20 
communities of practice (Shin, 2017; Teets et al., 2017). The second selection principle is 21 
capability: local governments need to demonstrate that they can conduct policy 22 
experimentation. This is evaluated based on their past record of relevant experimentation, as 23 
well as the quality of the prepared application. The third principle is diversity, which means 24 
that the central government aims to select pilots from different parts of the country to ensure 25 
the results of policy experiments are meaningful at a national level (Khanna et al., 2014).  26 
Financial subsidies are sometimes provided by the central government to support local 27 
experimentation, but this does not always happen (Lo, 2015c). Local experimentation at the 28 
first stage is sometimes guided by central policy documents, but if they exist, the instructions 29 
are often vague at this point, consisting mainly of key principles and policy rationales 30 
(Heilmann, 2008a). Local experimenters would formulate strategies based on these 31 
principles. The local experimentation process at this stage is also shaped by regular 32 
inspection and end-of-term evaluation, where experiences are summarised. Feedback and 33 
consultation between national policymakers and local experimenters are facilitated by regular 34 
conferences that deal with the lessons learned from local experiments (Heilmann, 2008b). 35 
When the central government deems that sufficient experience has been generated in the first 36 
stage of experimentation, the policy process proceeds to the second stage, which also 37 
involves piloting but at a much larger scale. This stage is known in China as ‘from point to 38 
surface’ (Heilmann et al., 2013). In this stage, new piloting opportunities are extended to a 39 
much larger number of local jurisdictions. Experimentation is again encouraged and guided 40 
by top-down policy documents, which usually contain more specific policy details. In this 41 
stage, communication is continued between the first wave of pilots and the second wave, as 42 
well as between the pilots and the central government. Again, local experiences would be 43 
communicated to the central government, which may result in timely policy adjustment in 44 
light of the new information provided about problems faced during experimentation. The 45 
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second stage is terminated when the central government deems the policy is sufficiently 1 
mature to be implemented nationally through central directives, government regulations or 2 
law (Heilmann, 2008b).  3 
The language of pragmaticism and experimentation is encapsulated in popular maxims, such 4 
as Deng’s famous ‘cross the river by feeling for the stones.’ Experimentation is prominent in 5 
the rhetoric of policymaking in China, dating back to the foundation years of the Chinese 6 
Communist Party (Heilmann, 2008a; Mei and Liu, 2014). This suggests that policy 7 
experimentation is a durable and institutionalised governance mechanism in China. Empirical 8 
evidence in support of the experiment under hierarchy model can be seen in studies 9 
examining very different policy areas—from economic development to housing policy to 10 
rural reforms (Heilmann et al., 2013; Millar et al., 2016; Teets, 2015; Zeng, 2015; Zhu and 11 
Zhang, 2015; Zhu and Zhao, 2018)—although fewer studies have linked it to policy 12 
innovation in the context of environmental and climate governance (Miao and Lang, 2015; 13 
Shin, 2018). 14 
Policy experiments are influenced by both top-down and bottom-up politics, although how 15 
contradictions between the two processes emerge and shape local experimentation has been 16 
subjected to continued debate. From a top-down approach, the central government 17 
coordinates local experiments by choosing individuals and institutions as local experimenters, 18 
shaping the content of experimental programmes through policy guidance documents, and 19 
selectively adopting local lessons to be emulated by others (Heilmann, 2008b; Mei and Liu, 20 
2014). However, in light of weakening ideological control, perceived effectiveness of central 21 
control mechanisms depends on the extent to which central policymakers can access 22 
information about the performance of local experimenters (Lo, 2014). The lack of financial 23 
support, conflicting demands from different central ministries, and the complexity of the 24 
evaluation system have further weakened the impact of top-down control (Kostka, 2016; Ran, 25 
2013; Teets et al., 2017). From the bottom-up, given the varied local conditions in China and 26 
the fact that the interests of local experimenters and central policymakers often differ, policy 27 
experimentation can take on distinct local characteristics or can be co-opted to serve local 28 
priorities (Eaton and Kostka, 2014; Lo, 2014; Wu et al., 2017). Theoretical and empirical 29 
evidence suggests that when ideals of national experimentation are situated in local contexts 30 
the contradictions are inherent to the delivery of China’s experiments become visible, as the 31 
example of the PVPA demonstrates. 32 
3. Background and methodology 33 
Despite experiencing unprecedented economic growth since the 1980s, China’s impoverished 34 
rural population stood at 56 million at the end of 2015 (State Council, 2016). Rural poverty is 35 
concentrated in interior China, reflecting the entrenched developmental imbalance between 36 
the wealthy coastal regions and poor hinterlands (Lemoine et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014; Lo et 37 
al., 2016). President Xi Jinping’s highly-publicized, well-resourced and whole-of-government 38 
strategy to eliminate rural poverty by 2020 called for a massive increase in funding for 39 
poverty alleviation alongside the adoption of a more targeted approach to addressing the 40 
longstanding problems of administrative inefficiency and waste (Liu et al., 2017). The 41 
concept of ‘targeted poverty alleviation’ was introduced, referring to the government’s 42 
improved ability to identify those living in impoverished conditions, as well as developing 43 
mechanisms of tailored assistance to alleviate causes of poverty (Zhou et al., 2018). 44 
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The PVPA has emerged as a central component of the grand poverty alleviation strategy and 1 
is designated as one of the government’s top ten poverty reduction initiatives (Zhang et al., 2 
2018). In addition to its primary objective of poverty alleviation, this policy is also intended 3 
to contribute to the achievement of China’s ambitious renewable energy targets and stimulate 4 
domestic demand for PVs in the context of American and European embargos (Andrews-5 
Speed and Zhang, 2018; Geall et al., 2018). The central government positions the PVPA as a 6 
means of generating income for those who live in remote and rural areas and are unable to 7 
work, such as the elderly and the disabled. To achieve the pro-poor objectives, the PVPA is 8 
supported by many policies. The main supportive policy is the solar feed-in tariff policy, 9 
which guarantees PV stations, including PVPA stations, a fixed income of 20 years (Li et al., 10 
2018; Lo, 2015a). For the majority of cases, electricity produced by PVPA is sold to the grid 11 
rather than consumed at source in order to maximise benefits from the feed-in tariffs, which 12 
are currently set at 0.65-0.85 RMB/kWh, depending on location. 13 
The pace of policy development of the PVPA has been fast, even by China’s standard. The 14 
experimentation of the PVPA started in October 2014, when the National Energy 15 
Administration (NEA) and the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation 16 
and Development (OPAD) jointly announced the plan to conduct piloting in 30 selected 17 
counties in six provinces (Anhui, Lingxia, Shanxi, Hebei, Gangsu, and Qinghai). In March 18 
2017, the NEA announced the second experimentation phase (2017-2020), which would 19 
cover 471 impoverished counties in 16 provinces and would benefit 2 million households 20 
from 35,000 villages. By the end of 2017, PV stations with a total capacity of 5.5 GW had 21 
been deployed, providing an income stream to 965,000 households (National Energy 22 
Administration, 2018). 23 
To explore the dynamics of local PVPA experimentation, empirical fieldwork was conducted 24 
in a pilot location in interior China, which will be referred to throughout the paper with a 25 
pseudonym (North County). North County was chosen as a case study because it is a site of 26 
PVPA experimentation. The county is a remote and largely rural area with a vast, open, flat 27 
terrain and a semi-arid, continental, monsoon climate. The county’s economy is heavily 28 
dependent on agriculture, especially corn. The natural environment is characterised by the 29 
profusion of unfarmable saline-alkaline flatland, comprising approximately 50% of the total 30 
area of the county (Figure 1). The degraded environment and its remoteness contribute to 31 
widespread poverty: in 2017, there were over 90 villages officially designated as 32 
impoverished with more than 40,000 registered rural poor, or approximately 10% of the 33 
population. Due to ample sunshine and the abundance of saline-alkaline land, North County 34 
meets the requirements for PV installation of good sunlight and a large area of flatland. The 35 
experimental objective of the county is to support 10,000 impoverished households through 36 
the PVPA. 37 
Two rounds of fieldwork were conducted over a two-year period (2017 and 2018). The 38 
objective of the two rounds of fieldwork was to trace the impact of policy changes on local 39 
experimentation. The sample included 21 interviews with key informants with government 40 
officials from three different levels of government (the provincial-level energy and poverty 41 
offices, the energy and poverty offices of North County, and the leaders of village 42 
governments that have implemented the PVPA) and 15 interviews with members of 43 
impoverished households in nine PVPA villages. These villages were chosen because they 44 
had PV stations installed in 2017 (Figure 2). For the selection, we used information published 45 
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in both the Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff Subsidy List published by the Ministry of 1 
Finance and the North County Photovoltaics Poverty Alleviation Evaluation Report published 2 
by the county government. The PVPA projects in all nine villages were built in the first half 3 
of 2017 and connected to the grid by the end of June, meaning that they had been operational 4 
for one year at the time of our second visit in July 2018. 5 
 6 
Figure 1. A typical landscape of North County 7 
 8 




4. Top-down politics 1 
The document analysis and interviews show the central government shapes local PVPA 2 
experimentation primarily through two means: the promulgation guiding policy documents 3 
and the approval process, which is required before a locality can become a pilot. Our analysis 4 
suggests the central government is conscious of creating space for local governments to 5 
experiment with different policy options, but at the same time not afraid to interfere when it 6 
deems necessary. This results in an ad-hoc policy refinement process that results in a shift 7 
from governance by goals to governance by rules and can be seen as a product of policy 8 
learning from local experimentation. 9 
During the early phase of experimentation, the central government attempted to encourage 10 
experimentation with different practices in order to identify what might work best. The lack 11 
of practical knowledge at this stage meant that the central government had to rely on defining 12 
goals to guide local experimentation. The Opinion on the Implementation of PVPA (OIP) 13 
released in April 2016 directed attention to the pro-poor objective (providing households 14 
without labour ability at least 3000 RMB per year for at least 20 years) sought by the central 15 
policymakers rather than to the specific implementation instructions. 16 
Nevertheless, the central government highlighted certain key issues that require the attention 17 
of local policymakers and provided some policy options as the foundation of 18 
experimentation. For example, while the OIP stated that the PVPA was not applicable 19 
everywhere, it did not identify eligible villages. Instead, the OIP tasked county governments 20 
with identifying suitable villages with establishing clear rules and transparent processes to 21 
ensure the selection outcome is fair. Similarly, the OIP stated that impoverished households 22 
and villages should not be required to contribute funds to the implementation of the PVPA, 23 
but did not specify what other funding mechanisms the PVPA should use. Instead, the OIP 24 
suggested that the local government could use the poverty funding and low-interest loan from 25 
the Agricultural Bank and the National Development Bank to support the PVPA. The OIP 26 
also recommended three types of PV projects: rooftop solar power (RSP), village-level solar 27 
power (VSP) and centralised solar power (CSP). RSP refers to small scale solar units 28 
installed in individual houses and owned by individual households. VSP are medium-scale 29 
power stations installed within a village jurisdiction, owned by the village committees who 30 
are responsible for managing the collective economy. CSP are large-scale power stations 31 
owned by companies and requiring a significant investment in CSP. 32 
In 2018, we noticed how the central government has considerably strengthened the top-down 33 
control by establishing additional rules, which introduced more limits on local discretion 34 
(Table 1). The Management Methods of the PVPA (MMP), released in March 2018, 35 
introduced a series of restrictions over programme eligibility, such as stating that the 36 
construction site cannot belong to agricultural land or non-agricultural construction land. This 37 
came in addition to other land-use regulations that ruled out the development of ecologically 38 
significant land. It emphasised that the village collective should be the main beneficiary of 39 
the income generated from the PVPA, although the use of the funds must be for poverty 40 
alleviation purposes. The MMP strongly promoted VSPs, likely from experiences showing 41 
that the cost of rooftop systems is too high whereas the CSP has often been exploited to 42 
circumvent the solar power quota imposed by the central government. The MMP also 43 
introduced clear regulations over the size: 300 kW for a typical VSP, which can be relaxedto 44 
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500 kW if technical conditions such as grid capacity are met. In one of the most striking 1 
policy changes, the MMP strictly forbade local governments to finance PVPA through 2 
borrowing over the concern that borrowing would mean that less money was going to poor 3 
households. 4 
The approval processes were also modified in 2018 to strengthen central control of PVPA 5 
experimentation. At the early phase of experimentation, the central government did not 6 
control the approval process, in the sense that applicants could rely on getting permission 7 
quickly, according to our interviewee. In 2018, the central government introduced an online 8 
approval system of PVPA that imposed strict design parameters, such as the size of the 9 
proposed power stations. As an interviewee from the energy office explained: 10 
The State Council developed a new system to manage the approval of PVPA projects. To 11 
apply for the PVPA, we need to login to the system and choose a province, and then a 12 
county, and then a village, and then the system automatically generates the number and 13 
names of the impoverished households from the national database. The system set the 14 
size of PV stations at five kW-7 kW per household, so, for example, if the village has 20 15 
poor households, you can only choose to build a PV station of 100 kW-140 kW. (an 16 
energy office official) 17 
Access to the new approval system was given to the poverty office only. As the energy 18 
official noted, ‘the whole approval process has to be initiated by the poverty office; we (the 19 
energy office) provide support after it is approved. This is because we were not given access 20 
to the system’. Thus, by refusing the energy office access to the approval system, the central 21 
government sought to make the poverty office more involved in the planning process.  22 
Table 1. Comparison of top-down control in 2017 and 2018 23 
 2016 2018 
Responsible agency No clear guideline. The poverty office should be 
in charge. 
Site selection Tasked local governments to 
establish clear rules and 
transparent processes to 
ensure the selection is fair. 
Forbade the use of 
agricultural land or non-
agricultural construction 
land for building PVPA. 
Technical design Provided three options: No 
clear guideline. Roof-top 
solar power (RSP), village-
level solar plants (VSP), and 
concentrated solar plants 
(CSP). 
VSP as the preferred mode 
and there are guidelines on 
size of VSP (300-500 kW). 
Funding mechanisms Local government should 
use poverty funding and/or 
low-interest loan. 
Ban to prevent local 
governments to finance 
PVPA through borrowing. 
 24 
5. Bottom-up politics 25 
The energy office, the poverty office, and the forestry office were the main players in bottom-26 
up politics over the experimentation of the PVPA. The PVPA requires expertise in both 27 
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renewable energy and poverty alleviation. However, the experimental approach was made 1 
difficult by unsupportive local authorities. 2 
One of the key bottom-up factors in North County was that the poverty office refused to get 3 
involved with the PVPA. This is quite puzzling given that the PVPA should help the poverty 4 
office achieve its political target of eliminating poverty by 2020. The poverty office’s refusal 5 
to get involved was often made on technical grounds; that the poverty officials do not have 6 
relevant technical expertise, so it is best to hand responsibility over to the energy office. 7 
However, when probing deeper, the poverty officials expressed surprisingly critical views 8 
about the PVPA, especially regarding the ways it helps the poor: 9 
The PVPA is going to turn people into lazy people, sitting at home waiting for income. It 10 
is quite an idealistic thought to give impoverished households 3000 RMB for 20 years, 11 
but that is just going to make people lazy. When we talk about poverty alleviation, we 12 
focus on self-help. We provide people with means of production, like a few sheep and 13 
cows to help them get milk, or some seed and equipment to help them grow fruit, but you 14 
have to work hard and succeed through your own effort. It is about giving people the 15 
means to generate income, not giving people money directly. (a poverty office official) 16 
This comment indicates that the PVPA faced ideological challenges from the local poverty 17 
office. In particular, the idea of giving money to the poor—which is the key goal of the 18 
PVPA—contradicts the belief held by the poverty officials at North County, which in 19 
Chinese is expressed as it is best to be ‘teaching to fish’ (i.e., creating new economic 20 
opportunities) rather than ‘giving fish’ (i.e., giving money to the poor) because the former is 21 
believed to be more sustainable while the latter creates dependency on the state. However, the 22 
central government now recognises that both ‘teaching to fish’ and ‘giving fish’ strategies 23 
can be effective and complement each other (State Council, 2018). The local attitude towards 24 
the PVPA is a symptom the discursive gap between the central policymakers and local 25 
officials. Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) argue from an institutionalist perspective that the 26 
success and failure of specific policies in contemporary China depend on consensus-building 27 
and cooperation among a significant number of policy actors. Such consensus building was 28 
clearly lacking in the poverty office of North County. 29 
The poverty office’s refusal to cooperate created two problems. First, the energy office had to 30 
conduct the experiment almost all by itself and, consequently, the design of PVPA did not 31 
have adequate input from the poverty office. Lack of input prevented the integration of the 32 
PVPA into a more comprehensive poverty alleviation strategy. Instead, technical factors 33 
dominated the PVPA design. Villages were chosen to install PVPA primarily on technical 34 
feasibility, particularly the capability of the grid to support the additional load created by the 35 
PV stations, rather than poverty alleviation needs. While the chosen villages were genuinely 36 
poor, many poor villages were ruled out of the implementation plan simply because they did 37 
not have enough grid capacity. The conservative size of the solar power stations stemmed 38 
from concerns over grid capacity. 39 
Inadequate funding for experimentation was the second problem. Despite the consistent 40 
decline in costs, constructing PV stations remains capital-intensive and requires significant 41 
upfront costs (Andrews-Speed and Zhang, 2018). Since the central government required that 42 
villages or households not be asked to pay, it was left to the local governments to figure out 43 
ways to finance the projects. Like many other policies, the central government did not create 44 
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specific funding tied to the PVPA. Instead, the central government wanted local governments 1 
to use funds earmarked for poverty alleviation to support the PVPA. North County was a 2 
national level poverty county and therefore received significant funding from the central 3 
government in support of its poverty alleviation activities. However, the funds earmarked for 4 
poverty alleviation were tightly controlled by the poverty office, who refused to release the 5 
funds to support the PVPA. With no other source of funding, the energy office had to limit 6 
the scale of the project, as well as request the contracted PV developers to help secure a loan 7 
from the bank, and to pay back the loan from the income generated by the solar power 8 
stations. This approach further reduced the ability of PVPA to support the poor. 9 
Another contradiction made obvious during the experimentation in North County was the 10 
conflicts between the energy office and the forestry office over land use. PV is land-intensive 11 
and the central government had explicitly forbidden the conversion of productive farmland 12 
into PV stations. In North County, during site selection, the energy office made sure that the 13 
PV stations were built on non-farmed land, such as saline-alkaline land. However, a large 14 
tract of the land had been classified as wetland of national significance and, therefore, was 15 
under the jurisdiction of the forestry office. Nevertheless, the local forestry office was not 16 
consulted during the site selection process, and after it found out that some PV stations were 17 
built on wetland designated as nationally significant, it ordered the PV stations to be 18 
removed. As a result of the removal, the villagers stopped receiving PVPA income, and they 19 
received no information or guarantee on whether they would ever get a new PV station. Land 20 
conflicts affected future projects as well. The village officials informed us that it became very 21 
difficult to build new PV stations because of the objection from the forestry office. Lack of 22 
enrolment of the Forestry Office at the earlier stages of the programme had further 23 
consequences for the future development of the PVPA.  24 
6. Contradictions and consequences 25 
The contradictions of top-down and bottom-up politics discussed above eventually shaped the 26 
possibilities of local experimentation i  North County. The local energy office, as the lead 27 
PVPA experimenter, was placed in a difficult situation. On the one hand, it needed to fulfill 28 
the central government’s goal of quickly installing PV to ensure that impoverished 29 
households would receive 3000 RMB per year, and on the other hand, it needed to design and 30 
implement the experimentation plan without the support of the other local bureaucracies, 31 
especially the poverty office. 32 
Despite the difficulties, the energy office was able to move quickly. A company was 33 
promptly set up by the energy office to manage the projects and handle the tendering 34 
procedure, although the village collectives would be the official owners of the PV stations. 35 
Contract tendering was released in February 2017, and contracts were awarded based on the 36 
price and historical record of the companies. While it is reported that rent-seeking and local 37 
protectionism are common in photovoltaic project development (Kayser, 2016), there was no 38 
local preference as there were no PV manufacturers in North County. The contract was 39 
ultimately awarded to several top-tier companies from Jiangsu, China’s leading PV 40 
production base. What followed was a frenzy of construction activity, which had only just 41 
begun in April because the long winter made it impossible to begin earlier. The energy office 42 
pushed to complete the installation—that is, to connect to the grid and produce electricity—43 
before the end of June, less than a year after the start of the experimentation. The State Grid 44 
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made the feed-in tariff payments generated by the PV stations to the poverty office, who then 1 
distributed the funds to the village committee. We verified with the impoverished households 2 
that they received the payment of 3000 RMB—the minimum amount required by the central 3 
government—in a timely manner, with the money deposited directly into their bank accounts. 4 
Most of those who received the funds had disability issues or were elderly people who had 5 
little ability to earn wages. The income they received was mostly spent on daily necessities 6 
such as medicine and food. 7 
Notwithstanding these positive results, there are some notable limitations and concerns that 8 
negatively affected the pro-poor impact of the PVPA in North County. The first problem was 9 
that the energy office had to limit  the scale of experimentation. While there were close to a 10 
hundred officially impoverished villages in the county that were eligible to participate in the 11 
PVPA under the guidelines defined by the central government, only nine PV stations were 12 
built by mid-2018, with no plans for more projects. Consequently, many impoverished 13 
households were unable to benefit from the PVPA. Most of the built PV stations were small 14 
(100 kW capacity). Capacity limited the amount of income that the PVPA could generate and 15 
reduced efficiency (Wu et al., 2018). All households and village officials to whom we spoke 16 
stated that they preferred the PV to be larger and generate more income, which was both an 17 
endorsement of the PVPA and a critique of the size of the PV stations. 18 
The second concern is over the distribution of the benefits. While we could confirm that 19 
impoverished households received 3000 RMB a year payment, there was no guarantee of 20 
how long such payment would continue. Interviews with village officials revealed that there 21 
were plans to cease payments after 2020. Instead, PVPA-generated income would be given 22 
directly to the village-level government with t e discretion to spend it as it sees fit. In this 23 
case, the village heads intended to use this income to fund a health insurance scheme 24 
benefiting everybody- not just the poor- in the village. Such approach goes against the central 25 
government’s pledge to support impoverished households for at least 20 years. As one 26 
official put it, ‘there will be no more poor people by 2020 according to the central 27 
government’. This represents a vision of poverty as a one-off, simple problem. Poverty is, 28 
however, a complex problem that depends on structural drivers of vulnerability. For example, 29 
PVPA benefited mostly the elderly and other groups of the population who are generally 30 
unable to work or access any other income. These poor households often cited illnesses and 31 
disabilities and made it clear that they were not able to escape the poverty trap without 32 
consistent support. However, local officials seemed unable to focus on action to address the 33 
structural drivers of poverty, deploying instead clichés about the distinction between lazy and 34 
deserving populations. The PVPA payment was conceived as a one-off experiment rather 35 
than as a long-term consistent strategy to alleviate poverty.  36 
The new approval system and guidelines introduced by the central government intended to 37 
address some of these experimentation problems. These changes, however, came too late for 38 
the projects already built in North County. Furthermore, the transfer of responsibility to the 39 
poverty office may not have made a difference because the poverty office remained 40 
steadfastly uninterested in the PVPA. While there was significant potential for future 41 
expansion, the local government currently has no plans to build new PVPA stations now, or 42 
in the foreseeable future. 43 
7. Concluding remarks 44 
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Environmental governance in China is typically conceptualised as a top-down process (Lo, 1 
2015b), but examining the PVPA from a multi-level governance perspective shows that both 2 
top-down and bottom-up politics are essential in the context of policy experimentation. Local 3 
governments, as the primary implementers of the experimental approach, are empowered to 4 
make decisions according to their local settings, capacities, and constraints. Local discretion, 5 
subject to restrictions imposed by top-down control, is important in encouraging pragmatic 6 
innovation. The central government systematically orchestrat local experiments. These 7 
experiments are the means whereby the central government gathers information about what 8 
works and what does not through local experiences and then refine the policy in a step-by-9 
step fashion. Tasking local governments to experiment through implementation also has the 10 
advantage of expediting the policymaking process. PVPA is a highly innovative policy, 11 
which means that it could be time-consuming for the central government to understand—let 12 
alone to weight—the intended and unintended consequences of the many different options in 13 
the technical, financial, and management components of the program. By not having to work 14 
out a detailed plan, China’s approach allows for the quick introduction and implementation of 15 
PVPA. 16 
Initially, the case study suggests that China’s attempt to explore new, pro-poor, co-benefits of 17 
low-carbon policies through policy experimentation has been frustrated by the contradictions 18 
between top-down and bottom-up politics, manifested by uncooperative local officials. 19 
Environmental governance can be mobilised to suggest a menu of options about how to 20 
improve the implementation of the PVPA, for example, through an engagement with 21 
conventional ideas of coordination and alignment. For example, collaboration among the 22 
energy office, the poverty office, and the forestry office since the beginning of the project 23 
could have delivered radically different results. Cultural change in the poverty office about 24 
the co-benefits of energy policies could have helped them to embrace the programme 25 
differently. A better understanding of the qualitative characteristics of poverty could have 26 
helped define targeted programmes for poverty reduction. These are all reasonable proposals. 27 
However, while we would not be opposed to any of those proposals, we think such analysis 28 
misses the point. 29 
The Central government uses the experimental approach not only to deliver policy but also, 30 
to design and test that policy. Developing a new policy is costly, disruptive and prone to 31 
failure. This approach enables the central government to fit policies on the go, without initial 32 
investment on the assumption that failure is allowed. In the PVPA case, for example, there is 33 
not only experimentation with technology and financial models, but also with the context of 34 
governance in which this policy is implemented. Bulkeley et al (2014) have argued that rather 35 
than looking at low carbon experimentation as a collection of separate, indeterminate projects 36 
we should be thinking of experimentation as the primary way in which energy and the 37 
climate are governed (cf. Turnheim et al., 2018). From this perspective, China provides an 38 
example of a system of governance which not only allows the experimentation approach but 39 
also, explicitly pursues it. The case of China also demonstrates that experimentation is not 40 
inherently benign. Bottom-up imaginations of community-based, low carbon experimentation 41 
contrast with the evidence that experimentation is a common approach among authoritarian 42 
states and obscure multinationals.  43 
Decentralising policy experimentation pushes the burden of policy development and the risk 44 
of failure to local governments, and thus may become sources of central-local conflicts. 45 
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Given that local governments, especially at the county level, have limited resources and 1 
capacity, and that they often do not receive sufficient financial support from the central 2 
government for conducting policy experiments, it is not at all surprising that experimentation 3 
results are often not ideal. On the other hand, these results have shaped a new generation of 4 
poverty alleviation policies. As Castán Broto (2015) has argued, the contradictions embedded 5 
in low carbon policies are the engines that continue moving action forward. However, 6 
moving forward comes at a cost. Low carbon policies should not be assumed to be inherently 7 
benign, as it became evident with the conflicts around the wetlands in North County. 8 
In sum, our analysis shows that the model of experimentation under hierarchy requires 9 
dynamic mechanisms that enable adapting national-level models to specific locations. The 10 
results emerged from a combination of top-down mechanisms of control, bottom-up 11 
responses and the broader contradictions that emerge from their interactions. In the case of 12 
the PVPA, the visionary approach of the national government—li king explicitly 13 
environmental and sustainable development goals—encountered resistance on the part of 14 
local authorities. Conversely, national visions were hindered by top-down mechanisms of 15 
control, which stiffened the possibilities for local appropriation and innovation in context. 16 
The experimentation under hierarchy approach is a strategy to deliver policy incompletely 17 
while sticking to ambitious goals. In practice, however, the question that matters is what 18 
transformations these policies enable? There is scant evidence of a democratisation of 19 
environmental governance or an actual material transformation of people’s lives. The 20 
appropriation of experimental approaches within what is, in essence, a technocratic state 21 
apparatus removes both ambiguity and potentiality and delinks experimentation from 22 
sustainability transformations.  23 
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